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TAKING JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY SERIOUSLY
LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER*
“And if you’re the intelligent man on the street and the Court issues a
decision,” explained Chief Justice Roberts in the oral argument in Gill v. 
Whitford, the blockbuster partisan gerrymandering case out of Wisconsin, 
“and let’s say, okay, the Democrats win, and that person will say: “Well, 
why did the Democrats win?”1 The answer would be based on what the 
Chief Justice labeled later in the oral argument as “sociological gobbledy-
gook.”2 But our man on the street is much too cynical for that. He will 
know “that’s a bunch of baloney.”3 The fancy methodological gymnastics 
will not be enough to disguise for our man on the street that “[i]t must be 
because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over the Republi-
cans.”4 And once this happens, the Chief Justice conclude?, it will “cause 
very serious harm to the status and integrity of the decisions of this Court 
in the eyes of the country.”5
This is not a new worry for the Chief Justice. During his confirmation 
hearing, in response to a question by Senator Hatch about the Court’s ap-
parent refusal to surrender to political pressure in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Chief Justice Roberts agreed that 
“considerations about the Court’s legitimacy are critically important.”6 The
Justices must “recognize that their role is a limited one. That is the basis of 
their legitimacy.”7 They must decide only cases and controversies, and 
must do so on the basis of law and not “on any view of what’s the best 
policy.”8 To go beyond that limited role and “start making the 
law . . . raises legitimate concerns about [the] legitimacy of their authority 
to do that.”9 Notably, then-Senator Sessions agreed, observing that “the 
* Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Maurer School of Law. 
1.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
2.  Id. at 40.
3.  Id. at 38.
4.  Id.
5.  Id.
6.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 143 (2005).
7.  Id. at 256.
8.  Id. at 161.
9.  Id. at 353.
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American people are beginning to believe that is occurring, and I think it 
does threaten legitimacy of the Court in a way that all of us who love the 
law should be concerned.”10 Sessions cabined the threat to legitimacy for 
“these kinds of activist cases.”11
This is not a unique worry. For example, Justice Frankfurter similarly 
argued that the Court must carefully nourish public confidence in its work, 
by “complete detachment . . . from political entanglements and by absten-
tion from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settle-
ments.”12 A similar concern animated the Court’s joint opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 and Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore.14 The argument traces as far back as 
1788, when Alexander Hamilton counseled that the judicial branch “may 
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”15
Chief Justice Roberts is in distinguished company.16
This Essay situates the Chief Justice’s comments within a growing 
empirical literature on the concept of judicial legitimacy. The Essay asks 
two questions. First, what drives Chief Justice Roberts’s comments about 
the legitimacy of the Court? More importantly, how are the concerns he 
voices during his confirmation hearing similar to the concerns he raises
during the Gill oral argument? And second, is the Chief Justice right to be 
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally Guy-Uriel 
Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of 
Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
13. See generally 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
14. 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we may never know with 
complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser 
is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of 
law.”); see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 
2000, at 5–6 (2001) (“[T]here is . . . widespread popular outrage at what the high court did . . . [and 
when the Court members] act in an unprincipled and partisan manner—as they did in Bush v. Gore—
they risk losing respect and frittering away the moral capital accumulated by their predecessors over 
generations.”).
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16. Scholars have raised similar concerns. See, e.g., Jeffery J. Mondak, Substantive and Proce-
dural Aspects of Supreme Court Decisions and Determinants of Institutional Approval, 19 AM. POL. Q.
174, 174 (1991); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular 
Expectations Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 182 
(2001); Jeffrey L Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, The Presidency and the Supreme Court After Bush v. 
Gore: Implications for Institutional Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101 
(2002).
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concerned? This is another way of asking, “[w]hat exactly could the Court 
do to undermine its legitimacy?”17
The Essay answers these questions in three Parts. Part I offers a defini-
tion of judicial legitimacy as acceptance of the Court as a constitutional 
branch, measured by public opinion polls. This version of judicial legitima-
cy is known as “diffuse support.” Part II equates judicial legitimacy with 
compliance and looks carefully at the interaction between the Court and the 
publics asked to bear the brunt of the Court’s particular mandates. This 
definition is known as “content legitimacy.” This Essay explains in Part III
that the Chief Justice is wrong on both counts. The Court’s legitimacy is 
generally secure. He is right to worry, but not for the reasons he posits. The 
legitimacy of the Court is secure so long as the Justices reach their deci-
sions through principled decision-making processes, as opposed to behav-
ing strategically, which the public may perceive as politically motivated. 
The man on the street does not care that the Court appears to side with one 
party over the other. He only cares that the Court follows a principled pro-
cess.
In fact, if the Chief Justice is truly worried about what the man on the 
street thinks and how he perceives the Court and its work, Gill v. Whitford
should be the least of his concerns. In Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31,18 the Court returns to 
the question of public sector unions for the third time, and whether unwill-
ing employees may be forced to pay “fair share” fees. The man on the 
street cannot possibly mistake Janus for anything other than a judicial foray 
into a politically charged controversy. He will know that a decision striking 
down public sector union fees, which will require overturning a forty-year-
old precedent, “must be because the Supreme Court preferred the [Republi-
cans and their wealthy donors] over the [Democrats].”19 Yet the Chief Jus-
tice does not seem concerned. Thus the larger question, which this Essay 
takes up briefly in Part III: What lies behind these general calls for safe-
guarding the Court’s judicial legitimacy?
17. Dion Farganis, Is the Supreme Court Bulletproof? Testing the Limits of Legitimacy with a 
New Experimental Design 3 (Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis omitted), 
http://research.allacademic.com/one/mpsa/mpsa08/index.php?click_key=1#search_top 
[https://perma.cc/28UY-BXKP].
18. 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 54 (2017). 
19. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38.
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I.
In his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, Justice Frankfurter lam-
basted a court majority for entering into the famed political thicket while 
attempting to remedy gross population disparities. His reasons were forth-
right and prudential: “The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the 
purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its 
moral sanction.”20 This is an old admonition. Publius told us as much while 
defending the virtues of the judiciary: “It may truly be said to have neither 
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”21 Decades later, Alexis de 
Tocqueville expressed a similar view while commenting on the power of 
judicial review: “Their [Supreme Court Justices’] power is immense; but it 
is a power of opinion. They are omnipotent as long as the people consent to 
obey the law; they can do nothing when they scorn it.”22
This is a view of judicial legitimacy as institutional loyalty. This is the 
idea that the public accepts and supports the Court as constitutional inter-
preter irrespective of particular outcomes reached or positions taken. This 
version of judicial legitimacy is known as “diffuse support.” This is a claim 
of public confidence about the Court and its work,23 a confidence measured 
by thermometer readings of public support for the Court.24 At the heart of 
this view of legitimacy is the mythic perception of the Court as a symbol of 
justice and liberty,25 or what Walter Murphy labeled the “cult of the 
20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Neither the Sword nor the Purse: The Dynamics of Public Confidence in the United States Supreme 
Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1209 (1986) (concluding that the judicial branch must “depend to 
an extraordinary extent on the confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of the public”).
21. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63
(1935) (“All the Court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question [in 
front of it]. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment.”).
22. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 142 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). For extended discussions of this view of the 
Court vis-à-vis public opinion, see generally William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme 
Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Response, Popular Influ-
ence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994).
23. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation 
of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1383 (1987).
24. See generally STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE.ET AL., INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL &
SOC. RESEARCH, ICPSR 2282, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY: 1997 PILOT STUDY (1998), 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2282#cite [https://perma.cc/AD52-928F].
25. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1071, 1072 (1936); Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937); 
see also Larry R. Baas & Dan Thomas, The Supreme Court and Policy Legitimation: Experimental 
Tests, 12 AM. POL. Q. 335, 336 (1984) (“It has long been part of the folklore of American politics—if 
not the conventional wisdom of political science—that Supreme Court mandates warrant popular 
acceptance because the Court can lay institutional claim to a public image as the polity’s conscience.”). 
For a more nuanced discussion of the development of the Court’s mythical vision, see David Adamany, 
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robe.”26 Courts are special, they are different, and it is for those reasons 
that they are respected and their edicts are obeyed.27 Studies conclude that 
the public accepts the legitimacy of the Court,28 even in the face of rulings 
with which the relevant publics disagree. But there is a caveat. Legitimacy 
is about loyalty, which is sustained through the special and symbolic status 
of the Court. It follows that the public remains loyal to the Court and its 
rulings so long as the symbols hold and the Court is viewed as unique.29
As a consequence, judicial legitimacy is compromised if the public 
comes to view the Court as “just another political institution.”30 This is not 
the same as ideological disagreements with specific judicial outcomes or a 
belief in the tenets of legal realism and the role played by ideology in judi-
cial decision making. Rather, this is the view that the Court is not unique 
and undeserving of both loyalty and an independent interpretive space. This 
is the view, in other words, that the Justices are nothing but “politicians in 
robes.”31 Worries about the loss of judicial legitimacy are thus overwrought 
and strategic in their own right. The public does not expect the Justices to 
behave as mechanical, non-ideological purveyors of legal principles.32 No-
tably, the public is both aware and accepting of the role that discretion 
plays in judicial decision-making. The legitimacy of the Court is secure so 
long as this discretion “is being exercised in a principled, rather than strate-
gic, way.”33 Risks to judicial legitimacy do arise when legal arguments do 
Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 790, 790–92 (1973); 
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 18–
31 (1996).
26. WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 13 (1964) (defining “[t]he cult of the 
robe” as “the concept of the judge as a high priest of justice with special talents for elucidation of ‘the 
law,’ that sacred and mysterious text which is inscrutable even to the educated layman,” and explaining 
that this conception of the judicial role “forms a sort of institutional charisma which is bestowed on 
judges with their oath of office”).
27. See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy 
Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 61 (2008).
28. See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635 (1992); James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the 
U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535
(2003).
29. See Gibson, supra note 27, at 71.
30. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: What Roles Do 
Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court 
Legitimacy?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 592, 592 (2017); see also JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY 
A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009).
31. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 30, at 595.
32. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
US Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195 (2011).
33. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 32, at 213. For scholars who defend the Court and its exercise 
of discretion, even in politically motivated ways, see TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A 
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not “stay within a rather large perimeter of holdings and rationales”34 and
judicial behavior strays from accepted norms.35
This is where Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns arise most forcefully. 
The Court must exercise “principled discretion.” But the Court’s behavior 
in the last generation does not support his case; in fact, it points in the op-
posite direction. Consider first one of the most notorious judicial interven-
tions of the last generation: the disputed recount in Florida after the 2000 
presidential election.36 The facts are straightforward. Vice President Gore 
asked for a recount and the Florida Supreme Court agreed with him. Gov-
ernor Bush turned to the federal courts and appealed the ruling. On Decem-
ber 4, the U.S. Supreme Court partially agreed with him and directed the 
Florida courts to pay careful attention to federal law. Gore then returned to 
state court and asked for a recount yet again, which the Florida Supreme 
Court granted in a surprising decision. This second time, on December 8, 
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the recount must include not 
only those uncounted ballots in Miami-Dade County but also all remaining 
“undercounts” throughout the state. This opinion surprised many, for it was 
assumed that Gore had run out of time and that the Florida Supreme Court, 
while sympathetic, would move aside and let the existing final count stand. 
Instead, by the narrowest of margins, the Court responded and breathed life 
into Gore’s fledging hopes. Bush appealed and on December 12, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued a ruling that, for all intents and purposes, ended the 
dispute.
This scenario raises many important questions. First came the second 
Florida Supreme Court opinion, issued on December 8. This opinion may 
be seen as implicitly defying the U.S. Supreme Court.37 Why did the state 
supreme court choose this route? It may very well be that they felt strongly 
about their position and the constitutional values at issue. It may also be 
true that they let their ideological pre-commitments get in the way of their 
POLITICAL COURT 188 (1999) (concluding that “continued legitimacy demands that the Court be policy 
motivated, and thus, politically sensitive and responsible in the exercise of its power”). and Thomas W. 
Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138–39 (1994) 
(“The legitimacy of the Court would in fact be enhanced rather than diminished if the Court renounced 
the idea that its decisions are compelled by law, and instead openly acknowledged that it exercises 
political discretion.”).
34. Farganis, supra note 17, at 29.
35. See generally Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy: Unan-
swered Questions and an Agenda for Future Research, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 132–50 (Robert M. Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo eds., 2018).
36. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam); Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (mem.); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
37. Cf. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams 
v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1456 (1994).
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better judgement. After all, they knew, or should have known, how the U.S. 
Supreme Court would ultimately rule, so why test its mettle? Why not take 
the prudential road? But these questions elide a more important issue: The 
state supreme court decided a question of state law. The state court deci-
sion was a test to the Supreme Court and how far the conservative Justices 
were willing to go.
The U.S. Supreme Court had many options. In light of prior ideologi-
cal and substantive commitments to our federal structure—namely, the 
conservative commitment to our federalism—we expected the conservative 
Justices to step aside and allow the state of Florida to resolve its own disa-
greements under state law. Ultimately, Congress could join the dispute.
This is straight out of Frankfurter’s playbook. Or else, the U.S. Supreme 
Court could stay the Florida ruling and seek to end the controversy once 
and for all. The U.S. Supreme Court chose the latter path and in so doing 
raised important prudential and doctrinal questions. Both questions directly 
inform my larger inquiry.
The doctrinal path taken by the conservative Justices raised many 
eyebrows. On equal protection grounds, the Court concluded that “[h]aving 
once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later 
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of an-
other.”38 This language calls to mind the Court’s deferential standard of 
review. But that is not the standard the Court applied. More importantly, 
this is a difficult position to defend, even for the Justices who espoused it.39
But that is precisely the point. Legitimacy as fidelity offers the Justices a 
very forgiving standard for measuring judicial behavior. This is true even 
in the face of a political context that posited the Court as a crass, partisan 
actor. In fact, this is precisely the concern that animates Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s worries in Gill. The man on the street could not help but view the 
Court’s intervention as anything but crassly partisan. More crucially, the 
case proffers a poignant example of a time when the Court should wade 
into political waters carefully. Analyses in the wake of Bush v. Gore, how-
ever, concluded that the Court’s legitimacy remained largely unaffected.40
If this case did not harm the Court’s legitimacy in any noticeable way, will 
any case ever will?
38. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
39. See id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances.”).
40. See generally Gibson et al., supra note 28; Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the 
Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s
Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001).
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Chief Justice Roberts provides us with two more recent example of the 
forgiving nature of the “reservoir of goodwill”41 that the public extends to 
the Court. The first case is National Federation of Independent Business. v. 
Sebelius.42 The Court faced a challenge to the Affordable Care Act, and 
specifically its individual mandate, which required those individuals not 
exempted by the Act to purchase their own health insurance or else face a 
“shared responsibility” penalty. In a 5–4 decision authored by the Chief 
Justice, the Court concluded both that the suit was not barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act because Congress did not intend the individual mandate to 
be treated as a tax, but as a penalty; but also that the individual mandate 
was a valid exercise of Congressional power as a tax under the Taxing 
Clause.43 Thus, the Individual Mandate was simultaneously a tax and not a 
tax. More importantly, this was a surprising position for the Chief Justice to 
take, especially since he was rumored to be a dissenting vote in the case. 
His vote in Sebelius, in fact, is known as the “Roberts Flip,”44 a strategic 
move to safeguard the Court’s legitimacy.45 The irony is inescapable. In 
attempting to safeguard the legitimacy of the Court, the Chief Justice be-
haved precisely as social science warns him not to behave.
A second case is Shelby County v. Holder.46 In Shelby County, the 
Court struck down section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act—its coverage 
formula—under its particularized reading of “basic principles” of federal-
ism.47 The conclusion is itself unsurprising, particularly for a conservative 
Court. But the subtext of the opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, 
raises questions at the heart of his larger concerns about judicial legitimacy. 
In Shelby County, the law as it then existed did not help the Court majority 
much. The argument was whether Congress could treat the states different-
ly, as it did under the coverage formula. For the Court in 2013, the Consti-
41. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965) (defining “diffuse 
support” as “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate 
outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants”).
42. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
43. Id. at 543–47, 574.
44. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 
2012, 9:43 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/6SLF-WHPP].
45. See Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763 
(2013); Timothy Noah, States of Confusion, NEW REPUBLIC (July 12, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/104887/trb-states-confusion-john-roberts-healthcare 
[https://perma.cc/ZF8R-DTWM] (“The Supreme Court’s decision in the health care case is best under-
stood as an attempt to maximize damage to established legal precedent . . . . Roberts wanted to avoid 
getting pilloried as a rightwing extremist who doesn’t care whether people get health insurance or 
not.”).
46. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
47. Id. at 2631.
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tution established a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty”48 between
the states. The problem was that the relevant legal materials did not so 
hold. In fact, the relevant precedent, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, held 
the exact opposite. Rather than simply overrule the case, Chief Justice 
Roberts distorted the meaning of a key passage in South Carolina and pre-
tended that the case supported his conclusion. It did not. Not even close.49
But this was nothing that a few key deletions and ellipses could not cure: 
“The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does 
not bar this approach, for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon 
which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local 
evils which have subsequently appeared.”50 The opinion is not even soph-
istry. This is a sleight of hand.
Observers are entitled to ask whether the Shelby County opinion com-
promises the Court’s legitimacy as Chief Justice Roberts understands the 
concept. Thankfully for the Chief Justice, the Court’s legitimacy does not 
hinge on the quality of its written work.51 In fact, the public gives the Jus-
tices a great deal of interpretive space within which to craft its opinions. 
According to a recent study, “[o]nly the most radical and extreme decisions 
appear able to put a dent in public loyalty to the Court. Put differently, 
provided the Justices stay within a rather large perimeter of holdings and 
rationales, the Court’s legitimacy is secure.”52
The implications of Bush, Sebelius, and Shelby County are clear for 
the Gill case. The same Court that found a doctrinal way out of the morass 
of the 2000 election can find a doctrinal way out the gerrymandering mess, 
even in the face of partisanship critiques. The legitimacy of the Court 
needn’t be compromised. Similarly, the same Chief Justice who penned the 
Sebelius and Shelby County opinions would find a similar path to his de-
sired conclusion in Gill. This is not a question of law or standards, as Sebe-
lius and Shelby County show. Abstract concerns about judicial legitimacy 
are not a good reason for the Court to decide not to decide. Chief Justice 
Roberts clearly knows better.
48.  Id. at 2623 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009)).
49.  See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting
Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2014).
50.  See id. at 519–20 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)). The
strikethrough is the original language from Katzenbach that was excluded by Chief Justice Roberts in 
Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203, which Roberts then relied upon for his opinion in Shelby County.
51.  See Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court
Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 214 (2012).
52.  Farganis, supra note 17, at 29.
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II.
A second view of judicial legitimacy argues that a recalcitrant public 
will not comply with the Court’s decision simply because the Court de-
mands it. This version of judicial legitimacy is known as “content legitima-
cy.”53 This is a version of legitimacy as compliance. It asks whether 
“citizens are more likely to comply with [the Court’s] decisions, even when 
they are unpopular.”54 The point is whether the public will accept the 
Court’s edicts precisely because the Court issues them. In the abstract, this 
version of legitimacy as compliance does not find support in the available 
data.55 Judicial endorsement of a particular policy will not lead to mass 
acceptance.56 But this is too simplistic. The power to exert compliance 
from one’s rulings invokes a complex array of institutional and social fac-
tors.57 The relevant question is this: when do the affected parties comply or 
resist a given judicial mandate?
53.  See Adamany, supra note 25, at 802.
54.  James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice,
and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 472 (1989); see Adamany, supra note 25, at 802 
(defining the “legitimacy-conferring power” of the Court as the power to “generate consent,” to “create 
acceptance of policy among those who oppose or are neutral about its substance and heighten ac-
ceptance among those already committed to its content”); RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF 
COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 143, 149 (1967) (ex-
plaining that the Court engenders the impression of “majestic fairness, reasonableness, and expertness,”
and that this impression is crucial, for it may lead individuals to comply with Court rulings even if in 
disagreement with them); Michael J. Petrick, The Supreme Court and Authority Acceptance, 21 W. POL.
Q. 5, 5–6 (1968) This research is similar to the impact studies literature, which also defined the Court’s
effect as a question of compliance/noncompliance. See Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court’s Im-
pact: Some Problems of Conceptualization and Measurement, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41, 42 (1970).
55.  See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 405, 407 (1983); Baas & Thomas, supra note 25; Gibson, supra note 
54 (finding that the Court’s ability to elicit acceptance from those who disagree with its conclusions is 
minimal at best); Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific 
Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 85, 92 (1980); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public-
ity, Public Opinion and the Court, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 985, 1005 (1989). But see Valerie J. Hoekstra & 
Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 
58 J. POL. 1079, 1097 (1996) (questioning the conclusion that the Court has no ability to legitimize 
policy decisions).
56.  Baas & Thomas, supra note 25, at 351–52. The Court does, however, have some limited
ability to elicit acceptance for unpopular rulings from opinion leaders. See Gibson, supra note 54. For 
criticisms of the relevant research, see Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE
AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 310 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 
1991); Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 55. 
57.  See generally CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984). See also Petrick, supra note 54, at 7; Jeffery J. Mondak, Policy 
Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of Legitimation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 675, 
690 (1994) (concluding that while the association of a policy with the Court can augment the policy’s
legitimacy, “the magnitude of this effect is determined by the interaction of numerous contextual fac-
tors”).
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To name but a few examples: Vice President Gore acquiesces to the 
Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore.58 Local boards refuse to acquiesce to the 
Court’s holding in the school prayer cases.59 Congress follows the amend-
ment route after the Court’s decision in United States v. Eichman.60 Line-
item vetoes remain on the books long after the Court’s decision in INS v.
Chadha.61 How to explain these different responses to judicial rulings? 
Answers to this question must focus on three factors.
First, there is an important distinction between decisions against na-
tional institutions and decisions against state and local actors. When the
Court strikes down (or narrows) a federal statute, as in Shelby County,62 or
cabins the authority of the executive branch, as in Boumediene v. Bush,63
the Justices stake out a position against a national majority. This is a pure 
Marbury question, instances when the Court performs its accepted duty as 
intended constitutional interpreter vis-à-vis its constitutional partners. This 
is a very different dynamic from when the Court acts against state and local 
institutions. For these, the Court deals, at best, with localized majorities, at 
worst with entrenched factions unwilling to cede their power voluntarily.
Within the national context, the Court is popularly understood as sole 
interpreter of the Constitution. This is the legacy of Marbury v. Madison
and the bargain we exacted at the founding. Once the Court determines 
“what the law is,”64 all constitutional actors must follow this interpretation. 
A refusal to comply with a court decision carries risks and costs. Yet think 
of how many times compliance questions arise at this level. Leading exam-
ples counsel in the opposite direction. In Shelby County, for example, a 
near unanimous Congress readily acquiesced to what may charitably be 
58. See Vice President Al Gore, Presidential Election Concession Speech (Dec. 13, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/us/43rd-president-his-remarks-gore-says-he-will-help-bush-bring-
american-together.html [https://perma.cc/873F-F4T2] (“Now the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken. Let 
there be no doubt, while I strongly disagree with the court’s decision, I accept it.”).
59. See LYNDA BECK FENWICK, SHOULD THE CHILDREN PRAY? A HISTORICAL, JUDICIAL, AND
POLITICAL EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER 132–35 (1989); KENNETH M. DOLBEARE &
PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE
27–28 (1971); William M. Beaney & Edward N. Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and 
Schempp on the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475 (1964).
60. 496 U.S. 310 (1990); see H.R.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995); S.J. Res. 31, 104th Cong. 
(1995).
61. See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT NO. 87-389, LEGISLATIVE VETOES 
ENACTED AFTER CHADHA (1987); Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: 
The Legislative Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 705 (1985); Elliot H. Levitas & Stanley M. 
Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to Congressional Arms, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 593, 
616 (1994).
62. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
63. See 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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described as a farcical reading of precedent. In Sebelius, Congress similarly 
relented to the Court’s curious reading of the Affordable Care Act. Consid-
er also City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court struck down important 
aspects of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a statute enact-
ed directly in response to a prior judicial interpretation.65 What is interest-
ing and remarkable in this case is not whether the Court has the power to 
reign in Congress as it did, but why a nearly unanimous Congress acqui-
esces to the view of six Justices of the Supreme Court. This is no idle sen-
timent. Think also of the Nixon tapes and the Court’s decision that he, the 
President of the United States, must turn them over.66 Why should Presi-
dent Nixon comply, and what would happen if he didn’t?67 Or farther back: 
think of the much-vilified Hughes Court during the New Deal, for example. 
For all the bad print directed at that judicial era, isn’t it remarkable that 
questions of compliance hardly arose? Instead, President Roosevelt reacted 
politically and sought to curb the Court’s excesses.68 Think, of course, of 
Marbury itself.69
When it comes to the Court’s power against state and local govern-
ments, a different story arises. In the school prayer and school desegrega-
tion cases,70 for example, the affected actors can argue that they can read 
the constitutional text as well as the Court, and don’t recall agreeing to 
those things the Court portends that they did.71 These cases pose crucial 
questions about the structure of our federal government; the Court must 
have the power to invalidate state and local laws because the stability of the 
central government depends on it. Justice Holmes’s words are particularly 
poignant in this context: “I do not think the United States would come to an 
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the 
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
65.  521 U.S. 507, 511–13 (1997).
66.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713–14 (1974).
67.  Compare President Jefferson’s conduct in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
and the Court’s response in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
MARBURY V. MADISON : THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63 (2000).
68. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
69. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 87, 88 (1996). 
70. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.?421 (1962); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
71. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 54; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN?
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9–36 (1991).
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laws of the several States.”72 During his travels around and ultimate report 
on the young American nation, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized a similar 
structural dynamic at play. As he wrote, “nowhere is it more necessary to 
constitute the judicial power strongly than in confederated peoples, because 
nowhere are there individual existences that can struggle against the social 
body greater and in a better state to resist the use of the material force of 
the government.”73
Yet local majorities need not follow the Court’s lead, and few mecha-
nisms exist to enforce the Court’s ruling.74 In an infamous voting rights 
case, Giles v. Harris, Justice Holmes made precisely this point:
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to 
keep the blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more 
than ordering the plaintiff’s name to be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 
will be needed. If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece 
of paper will not defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the 
voting in that state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the 
plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.75
More crucially, imagine what happens in this instance were national 
public opinion against the local majorities’ view. Clearly, under such a 
scenario we have no way to make this local majority conform to national 
values, so these local majorities could go on and defy the “law” with impu-
nity. When in disagreement with the Court, a localized majority has much 
incentive to disobey general rulings until specific litigation is brought to 
bear on their jurisdiction. In turn, this incentive often ensures further non-
compliance, because litigation exacts a heavy cost on those individuals 
willing to test the mettle of local actors and institutions. This is the clear 
lesson of the difficult road to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and which 
culminated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.76
In sum: a number of factors, such as local elites, the specific social 
and political context in question, and the specific demands of the Court’s 
72.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96
(1920). For a modern exposition, see Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism,
66 JUDICATURE 236, 241 (1983) (“The [counter]majoritarian dimension [of judicial activism] also 
includes Supreme Court nullification of state laws, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances. 
Such voidings arguably are less offensive in principle. A federal system requires some mechanism for 
reviewing local legislation in order to retain federal supremacy in specified areas.”).
73.  TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 142.
74.  Hoekstra & Segal, supra note 55, at 1096 (“[W]e find that the more immediate the situation is
to one’s personal life, the less likely one is to defer to the judgment of some other source, even one 
thought to be highly credible.”). 
75.  189 U.S. 475, 488 (1902).
76.  See generally John Doar, The Work of the Civil Rights Division in Enforcing Voting Rights
Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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ruling on the relevant actors, inter alia, determine whether the Court will be 
obeyed or defied.77 In relevant contrast, when the Court speaks to national 
institutions in the name of national majorities, public opinion may turn on 
any defying institution quickly.78
Second, compliance will vary depending on the issue in question.79
Not all cases are alike. For issues that the public perceives as having right 
or wrong answers, such as abortion and affirmative action, the Court’s 
power is at its lowest ebb.80 More mundane issues, or issues that fail to 
engage the public similarly, offer the Court with a much wider space within 
which to exact compliance.
Third, compliance is influenced by whatever interpretive space an in-
stitution is proffered to decide constitutional issues by itself. This under-
standing of interpretive authority is known as departmentalism, and it 
presumes that each institution is called to interpret the Constitution as part 
of its institutional duties. For support, turn briefly to Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion in Marbury. Recall the three examples he offered at the end 
of the opinion to clinch his conclusion. Conveniently enough, all three 
examples involved judicial questions that belonged squarely within the 
judicial branch. For example, he wrote, “It is declared that ‘no tax or duty 
shall be laid on articles exported from any state.’” “Suppose,” he contin-
ued, “a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit insti-
tuted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? [O]ught 
the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law[?]”81
His third example was more specific. He first offered the relevant constitu-
77. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 57; see also Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter 
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 775 (1992) (“Even if ‘defiance’ strictly 
speaking is not at issue, majoritarian dissatisfaction with judicial decisions seems to make itself felt 
strongly enough that judges get the message and alter the nature of the underlying rights.”); cf. Thomas 
R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. 
POL. Q. 493, 503 (1989) (“The modern Court’s ability to hand down enduring decisions is very closely 
linked to the Court’s unanimity, the ruling’s ideology, and to the distribution and attentiveness of mass 
public opinion.”).
78. For a similar understanding, which concludes that the most controversial judicial decisions 
after 1973 have not been against national lawmaking majorities, but state governments, see Martin 
Shapiro, The Supreme Court from Early Burger to Early Rehnquist, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 47, 49 (Anthony King ed., 2d ed. 1990). See also Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and 
National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976).
79. See Bradley C. Canon, The Supreme Court as a Cheerleader in Politico-Moral Disputes, 54 J.
POL. 637, 652 (1992); Jeffery J. Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme 
Court, 20 AM. POL. Q. 457 (1992); Murphy & Tannenhaus, supra note 55, at 1004-05; see also Ada-
many & Grossman, supra note 55, at 425 (contending that the Court’s resiliency against political at-
tacks is due to the fact that it engaged the “dominant noneconomic domestic issues of our time”).
80. Canon, supra note 79, at 652 (“Politico-moral clashes by their very nature are largely immune 
to judicial claims of authority or legitimacy.”).
81. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803) (emphasis added).
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tional text: “No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimo-
ny of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.” 
Marshall’s analysis was particularly illustrative:
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the 
courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be de-
parted from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one
witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the 
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?82
These questions have easy answers. Were Congress to enact said stat-
utes, the courts need not give them effect. This is one way to understand 
the interaction between the Court and Congress over RFRA.83 With RFRA, 
Congress not only attempted to override a judicial decision, but went much 
further: it sought to alter the doctrinal mechanics when applied to neutral 
statutes of general applicability. This was an easy case for the Court. In this 
vein, think also of the passive doctrinal stance for questions of foreign poli-
cy or the political question doctrine itself. These are pure Marbury cases,
where each department is best left to interpret those constitutional matters 
that pertain to the locus of their authority. This position dates back to the 
early years of the country84 and has much scholarly support. 85
III.
The concept of judicial legitimacy offers an important reminder about 
the Court and its work. Courts must ensure that their behavior comports 
with pre-established norms, so relevant publics will do as the courts ask. A 
82. Id.
83. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2016).
84. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1905) (“But nothing in the Constitution has given them 
a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are 
equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them.”). But see Wallace Mendelson, Jefferson
on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 327 (1962) (concluding that 
Jefferson’s own view was not always against a theory of pure judicial review, as it seems he changed 
his mind in order to justify executive refusal to execute judicial decisions arising from the Alien and 
Sedition Acts).
85. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2D
367, 376 (1999) (“Marshall’s more original thought was his inscription into the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court of the idea that the courts are not the only institutions whose province and 
duty includes the exposition and interpretation of the law.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dan-
gerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Mark Tushnet, 
Marbury v. Madison and the Theory of Judicial Supremacy, in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
19 (Robert P. George ed., 2000). This is perhaps the received view. As Professor Paulsen asks, “[a]re 
we really all ‘departmentalists’ now? Will nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?” Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and 
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 385 (1994).
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lack of legitimacy signals the death knell of judicial authority. As this Es-
say illustrates, however, judicial legitimacy is a trope deployed by judges in 
the pursuit of specific outcomes. It does very little interpretive work on its 
own. It is a warning about the future and how a judicial outcome may be 
received, yet a warning that operates more as a boogeyman. It is a criti-
cism, a call for restraint, yet lacking in empirical support.
Notably, calls for safeguarding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court 
have risen markedly in recent years. Since 1954 and the Brown ruling, the 
Justices have referenced warning about judicial legitimacy seventy-one 
times, and only nine times in the prior 164 years.86 Chief Justice Roberts’s 
warnings fall squarely within this trend. His warnings also find a receptive 
audience within the Law of Democracy, an area once dominated by Justice 
Frankfurter and the political question doctrine. But Justice Frankfurter was 
wrong about the risks posed by redistricting questions to the legitimacy of 
the Court. He was wrong both as a matter of diffuse and content legitimacy. 
There is nothing to suggest the narrative will change and Chief Justice 
Roberts will be proven right.
Chief Justice Roberts is wrong about diffuse legitimacy. Recall Justice 
Frankfurter’s worry that “[a]pportionment battles are overwhelmingly party 
or intra-party contests.”87 The authority of the Court springs from public 
support, a feeling that “must be nourished by the Court’s complete detach-
ment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by ab-
stention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political 
settlements.”88 These were the redistricting cases. This was Baker v. Carr.
This was also, more pertinently, Reynolds v. Sims.89 Yet these cases repre-
sent a triumph of judicial statesmanship, a needed incursion into questions 
of politics.90 These cases inform John Hart Ely’s ground-breaking theory of 
judicial review.91 Chief Justice Roberts has no reason to believe that a deci-
sion in the political gerrymandering cases would harm the legitimacy of the 
Court. The Court has decided extreme partisan cases, where our “intelligent 
man on the street” cannot help but conclude that the Court is taking sides in
partisan controversies. This was Bush v. Gore, a case that did not harm the 
86. Farganis, supra note 51, at 207.
87. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
88. Id. at 267.
89. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, Fair 
Representation, and the Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 423
(2006).
90. See Schuck, supra note 23, at 1381.
91. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
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legitimacy of the Court. For a more recent example, look no further than 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Council 31, the public-sector union case from this term.
In Janus, the Justices return to an old question. The issue is whether 
public-sector employees who are not union members can be required to pay 
“fair share” fees to support contract negotiations for all employees. Forty 
years ago, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,92 a unanimous Court 
upheld these fees under the First Amendment. The plaintiff in Janus is
asking the Court to overrule Abood and strike down all mandatory union 
fees as forced speech. But this question is “old” in a more recent way. A 
similar challenge to “fair share” fees came to the Court three years ago, in 
Harris v. Quinn,93 but the Court concluded that the plaintiffs in the case 
were not public-sector employees. The issue came back a year later, in 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,94 but Justice Scalia’s death 
left the Justices deadlocked 4–4. The issue is now back for the third time in 
three years.
The “intelligent man on the street” is paying attention and he knows 
what he sees. The litigation in Janus is part of a “multipronged, multi-
tiered” legal strategy that has “not just brought labor to the brink of crisis 
but threatened the Democratic Party as well.”95 This is a judicial “[p]ower 
[p]lay [a]gainst [l]abor.”96 This is a case about the future of labor and all 
the political influence it wields in national politics. At its core, this is a case 
about Republicans and Democrats, and the “intelligent man on the street” 
knows that. So should Chief Justice Roberts:
If that concern applies in any case, it applies here, where the Court is be-
ing asked by avowedly partisan groups to wipe away a 40-year-old prec-
edent, which has been repeatedly reaffirmed, as part of a long-term 
political campaign. This background heightens the need for vigilance by 
the Court to zealously protect its apolitical role. Otherwise, the “intelli-
gent man” will reach only one conclusion: that the Court is being asked 
to reach a political decision because the interests involved in that cam-
paign think—and have telegraphed and telegraphed and telegraphed—
that, based on this Court’s changed membership, a 5-4 victory awaits 
them. Accepting that invitation on these terms risks causing that “very
92. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
93. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
94. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.).
95. Noam Scheiber & Kenneth P. Vogel, Behind a Key Anti-Labor Case, a Web of Conservative 
Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/business/economy/labor-
court-conservatives.html [http://perma.cc/2PJE-9KC7].
96. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Power Play Against Labor, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/opinion/supreme-court-labor-unions.html
[http://perma.cc/H4FY-HMQE].
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serious harm to the status and integrity of the decisions of this Court in 
the eyes of the country.”97
Notably, the Chief Justice asked very few questions at the oral argu-
ment in Janus.98 But if he were really worried about the legitimacy of the 
Court and its standing in the public eye, this issue would have been away 
from the Court’s docket long ago.
Chief Justice Roberts is also wrong about content legitimacy. This is a 
real abstract worry. Will the affected publics acquiesce to the Court’s de-
mands? The modern answer, in a word, is yes. Think here about the after-
math of the reapportionment revolution, a time when the Court declared 
unconstitutional at one time or another a super majority of seats in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and most state legislatures. The reaction from the 
states was nothing short of remarkable. The “one person, one vote” revolu-
tion spread like a wildfire across the United States. Of particular interest is 
the fact that Justice Frankfurter had the better argument: this equipopula-
tion standard was a judicial creation in no way connected to the Constitu-
tion.99 Or in Justice Harlan’s famous words:
Stripped of aphorisms, the Court’s argument boils down to the assertion 
that appellees’ right to vote has been invidiously “debased” or “diluted”
by systems of apportionment which entitle them to vote for fewer legis-
lators than other voters, an assertion which is tied to the Equal Protection 
Clause only by the constitutionally frail tautology that “equal” means 
“equal.”100
But this hardly matters. “The short-term response,” according to Rob-
ert McCloskey in the Harvard Law Review foreword of that year, “has been 
nothing short of astonishing.”101
Think also about the aftermath of the Shelby County case, when the 
Court struck down a vital section of the Voting Rights Act under a dubious 
if not farcical reading of prior cases. Unremarkably, congressional acquies-
cence followed. Better yet: think of the last time congressional majorities 
pushed back against the Court? RFRA provides one such example. In Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,102 the Court held that the First Amendment is 
97. Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse and Richard Blumenthal as Amici Curiae in Support 
Of Respondents at 22, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, No. 16-1466 (U.S. 
Jan. 18, 2018), 2018 WL 509655 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, supra note 1).
98. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Janus, No. 16-1466, 2018 WL 1050563.
99. For a discussion on this point, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds 
Revisited, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 21, 49–52 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
100. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101. Robert G. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term—Foreword: The Reapportionment 
Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1962).
102. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
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not violated when a prohibition on a religious exercise is not the object of 
state regulation but an incidental effect of a generally applicable and oth-
erwise valid provision. More specifically, the Court concluded that the 
religious motivation for using peyote did not exempt Smith from the reach 
of a criminal law not specifically directed at his religious practice. Con-
gress overruled Smith under and commanded courts to apply a strict scruti-
ny test when the government burdens religion. In other words, Congress 
determined that the government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general ap-
plicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the per-
son is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est.”103 This was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. But in in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck down portions of the Act as applied to 
state and local actors. This is a remarkable act. City of Boerne not only 
refused to grant religion a protected status from substantial governmental 
burdens, but it also contravened a nearly unanimous congressional act.104
Six Justices brought Congress to its knees. Talk then shifted to the higher 
ground of constitutional amendment.105
Justice Kennedy is the deciding vote in Gill, and he is clearly worried 
about content legitimacy.106 It is less clear whether the Chief Justice is 
similarly worried. But he needn’t worry. Ironically, Chief Justice Roberts
should worry about the growing perception that his vote in Sebelius—what 
is known as the “Roberts flip”—was driven by strategic considerations. He 
should worry, in other words, that the public comes to understand the Court 
as any other political institution.107 But even then, the worry is relatively 
small. Judicial legitimacy is far more secure than concerned Justices let on.
103. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2) (2016).
104. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb)).
105. The flag burning controversy also proves illustrative. Soon after United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990), the talk soon shifted to the higher language of constitutional amendment. See
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
106. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Who’s Afraid of the Hated Political Gerrymander?, 104 KY. L.J.
561 (2015).
107. This is a way to make sense of the Chief Justice’s apparent switch in the recent Artis v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018). In Artis, the Chief Justice joined the court’s moderate wing in 
a rather mundane supplemental jurisdiction case, leading to much speculation about the reasons for his 
vote. See Linda Greenhouse, The Chief Justice, Searching for Middle Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/opinion/chief-justice-roberts-middle.html 
[http://perma.cc/RHR8-Z283]. Justice Gorsuch in dissent raised the specter of federalism loudly and 
often. Gorsuch worried that “we’ve wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of limited 
and enumerated powers that we’ve begun to lose sight of what it looked like in the first place.” Artis,
138 S. Ct. at 617 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). On this view, this was the latest installment of the ongoing 
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CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts joins a modern chorus of Justices raising con-
cerns over the concept of judicial legitimacy. But to answer a question 
raised earlier, there is very little the Court can do to compromise its legiti-
macy. The better question is why he raises this concern at all, as often as he 
does? What lies behind these warnings? It may be that he is truly con-
cerned. But once we take a look at his body of work, from Citizens United
to Shelby County to Janus, the public sector union case, it is hard to believe 
him. This is clearly a selective, outcome-driven concern. But more im-
portantly, there is nothing in the political gerrymandering cases that should 
concern him. History is on his side.
debate over our federalism. Why does the same Justice who wrote the Court’s opinion in Shelby County
and hailed the virtues of our federalism and the “equality of states” doctrine join the majority in Artis?
